REGIONAL TRADE CONFLICTS AGAINST THE AMERICAN-CHINESE GEO-ECONOMIC RIVALRY

Abstract

The article examines the aspects of the formation of a multipolar world, which are particularly clearly visible against the background of trade conflicts, disputes and confrontations. The zones of American, Chinese and European interests are visualized. At the same time, on the one hand, there is a narrowing of the US zone of interests (within the framework of the Monroe Doctrine), and on the other hand, there is an expansion of China's bridgeheads (within the framework of the "One Belt, One Road" and "Necklace of Pearls" strategies). It is determined that it is precisely such transformations that cause short- and medium-term trade conflicts. It is stated that the main initiator of permanent trade conflicts is the United States, whose obvious task is to protect the domestic market from unfair competition. However, it is becoming increasingly unclear how this motivation works in both regional and global markets, as the use of protective measures is often unfounded, emotional, and sometimes openly hostile. Therefore, it is concluded that the trade conflicts initiated by the United States in recent years are a deliberate tool for moving away from global leadership and shifting responsibility to individual enclaves that are forming around China. Along with this, it was stated that the latter, although losing a number of competitive positions in Latin America, automatically gains coalition support from Canada and some European countries, which guarantees its future leadership. This demonstrates the absolute ineffectiveness of traditional instruments of trade pressure (in particular, customs blackmail), because, as has been established, the establishment of unmotivated tariff rates does not scare countries or their groups, but, on the contrary, makes them more determined to move away from traditional markets, currency mechanisms, and legislation. It is shown that the obvious results of this are the ongoing de-dollarization, the formation of alternative regional centers, banks, exchange mechanisms, etc. The conclusion is drawn about the accelerated elimination of hypertrophied trade dependence on the USA and those institutions that were formed under its auspices. And in this context, the choice is made in favor of China, which is not just becoming an alternative trading partner, but a counterforce capable of delivering a devastating trade blow to the United States (an example is the agreement signed between Canada and the PRC).